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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Peter Bistrian, a detainee at the Federal Detention 
Center (“FDC”) in Philadelphia, brought suit against prison 
officials there.  He alleges that they failed to protect him from 
other prisoners and punitively detained him in the FDC’s 
Special Housing Unit (“SHU”).1  The District Court granted 
qualified immunity to some defendants on some claims, but 
denied summary judgment on Bistrian’s constitutional claims, 
which were brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
 
                                                 
1  The SHU is a segregated housing unit where inmates 
may be placed for either administrative or disciplinary 
reasons.  Inmates are confined in solitary or near-solitary 
conditions in a “six by eight foot cell for 23 to 24 hours a day, 
with little or no opportunity to interact with other inmates[.]”  
(App. at 2923 ¶ 12.)  
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 
 
From August 2005 until March 2008, Bistrian was a 
detainee at the FDC while he awaited trial, was tried, 
convicted, and finally sentenced on charges related to wire 
fraud.  During that time, prison officials placed him in the 
SHU on four occasions.   
 
They first placed him in the SHU on November 18, 
2005, following allegations that he had violated telephone use 
rules.  He stayed there for approximately seven weeks, until 
January 9, 2006.  Three weeks later, on January 25, 2006, 
prison officials again put him in the SHU, this time because 
of “[s]ecurity [c]oncerns.”3  (App. at 94.)  He remained there 
for nearly a year, from January 25, 2006, to December 8, 
2006.     
 
During that second round of intensive detention, 
Bistrian earned some privileges and became an orderly, a 
prison job that provided him the opportunity to interact with 
other inmates housed in the SHU.  Knowing of Bistrian’s 
                                                 
 
2  In assessing an assertion of qualified immunity, we 
take the facts in the light most favorable to “the party 
asserting the injury,” which here is Bistrian.  Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007). 
3  What those concerns were is not in the record.  In 
February 2006, the Warden was informed that there was no 
detention order for Bistrian’s then current detention in the 
SHU.  Months later, in July, a prison official completed a 
detention order, noting that Bistrian was being detained for 
“[s]ecurity [c]oncerns.”  (App. at 94.)   
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access to others in the SHU, a fellow inmate, Steven 
Northington, asked him to pass notes between inmates.  In 
particular, Northington wanted to facilitate communication 
for another prisoner, his friend and criminal confederate 
Kaboni Savage.4  Bistrian told Officers Gibbs and Bowns of 
that request, rightfully believing they would be interested.  
That led to the formation of a surveillance operation in which 
Bistrian secretly passed inmate notes to prison officials.  
Prison officials photocopied the notes, and gave Bistrian the 
original to pass along.  All went as planned until Bistrian 
accidentally gave a photocopy of a note, instead of the 
original, to an inmate, thereby tipping off the SHU’s residents 
to Bistrian’s cooperation with prison officials.  After his 
cooperation became known, he received multiple threats and 
made prison officials aware of them, including defendants 
Bowns, Gibbs, Jezior, and Warden Levi.   
 
Despite their knowledge of the threats against Bistrian, 
on June 30, 2006, prison officials placed him in the recreation 
yard where Northington and two other inmates were also 
present.  In what, for ease of reference, we will call “the 
Northington attack,” Northington and the two others 
proceeded to brutally beat Bistrian.  Jezior and other officials 
yelled for the attack to stop, but they did not enter the yard.  
Instead, they waited until a larger number of guards (12 to 15) 
were present to intervene.  By then, the damage was done.  
Bistrian suffered severe physical and psychological injuries, 
                                                 
4  Northington and Savage were part of a Philadelphia 
drug gang and involved in witness intimidation, death threats 
to witnesses and law enforcement, and a firebombing that 
killed six family members of the government’s chief 
cooperating witness.   
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and that is the basis of his claim under the Fifth Amendment 
that the prison officials failed to protect him.5  
 
 In December 2006, less than a month after Bistrian had 
completed his nearly yearlong second detention, prison 
officials again placed him in the SHU.  They cited his safety 
as the reason for doing so.  According to the defendants, there 
had been death threats against him.  Shortly after that 
placement, Bistrian’s counsel sent a letter to Warden Levi 
asking why his client was there.  The Warden replied that 
records indicated it was due to an investigation.  Bistrian was 
released two days after that response, having spent 
approximately a month in the SHU.   
 
In August 2007, at a sentencing hearing, Bistrian 
objected to his treatment in prison and the time and 
circumstances of his administrative detentions.  After the 
hearing, the government provided Bistrian’s counsel with 
evidence of the telephone infractions they relied on as the 
justification for Bistrian’s confinement in the SHU.  That 
prompted an email exchange in which Bistrian’s counsel 
asked for an explanation of how Bistrian had violated prison 
policies.  Counsel for the government promptly forwarded 
that request to the FDC.   
 
Two days after Bistrian’s counsel pressed for an 
explanation, Bistrian was put in the SHU for the fourth time.  
                                                 
5  On October 12, 2006, Bistrian was again attacked in 
the recreation yard.  The attacker on that occasion, however, 
suffered from mental illness and was not known to be 
associated with Savage or Northington.  Bistrian does not 
contend that that event is relevant to any issue on appeal. 
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Officer Jezior wrote an incident report stating that Bistrian 
had again violated telephone use rules.6  Using available 
administrative procedures, Bistrian contested the placement 
but his grievance and appeal were denied.  Bistrian alleges 
that, after Warden Levi denied the appeal, the Warden said 
Bistrian “would never see the light of day again.”  (App. at 22 
(citation omitted).)  Bistrian was in the SHU for about three 
months, until early December 2007.  That final stay forms the 
basis of his First Amendment retaliation claim and his Fifth 
Amendment punitive detention claim. 
 
Bistrian was ultimately sentenced to 57 months’ 
imprisonment and sent to a correctional facility in New York.   
 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
This lawsuit began over a decade ago.  The operative 
pleading is an amended complaint asserting various First, 
Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims against FDC prison 
officials and medical staff, and claims under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (“FTCA”) against the United States.  The 
defendants filed motions to dismiss all nineteen claims in the 
amended complaint, saying there had been a failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies and a failure to plead 
sufficient facts to overcome the defense of qualified 
immunity.  Bistrian v. Levi, Civ. No. 08-3010, 2010 WL 
3155267, at *4-7 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2010).  The District Court 
granted those motions in part.  Id. at *1.  It dismissed thirteen 
claims but found that six were sufficiently pled to survive 
                                                 
6  The relevant detention order, however, stated that 
Bistrian was placed in the SHU “pending investigation of a 
violation of [Bureau] regulations.”  (App. at 131.)   
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dismissal, including Bistrian’s Bivens claims for violations of 
the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment.  Id. at *1.   
 
The defendants involved in this appeal, with others, 
then asked us to review the District Court’s denial of their 
assertion of qualified immunity.  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 
352, 364-65 (3d Cir. 2012) (Bistrian II).  We affirmed in part, 
but dismissed the claims against some defendants and limited 
the Bivens claims to a Fifth Amendment procedural due 
process claim, a Fifth Amendment substantive due process 
claim for failure to protect and another for punitive detention, 
and a First Amendment claim for retaliation.7  Id. at 377.  In 
doing so, we set forth the legal standards governing the 
claims we permitted to proceed.  Id. at 366-68, 372-76.   
 
 Following remand and years of extensive discovery, 
the remaining defendants filed motions for summary 
judgment, which the District Court granted in part and denied 
in part.  Bistrian v. Levi, 299 F. Supp. 3d 686, 713 (E.D. Pa. 
2018) (Bistrian III).  It granted summary judgment in favor of 
all defendants on the Fifth Amendment procedural due 
process claim because Bistrian had had the opportunity to 
                                                 
7  We concluded that only certain periods of 
confinement in the SHU could give rise to plausible 
retaliation or punitive detention claims, excluding the periods 
Bistrian was actively engaged in the note-passing operation.  
Bistrian II, 696 F.3d at 374-75.  We reasoned that the 
defendants reasonably confined Bistrian to the SHU for his 
own safety during that time.  Id.   
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challenge each SHU confinement.8  Id. at 707-10.  It denied 
summary judgment on the other three Bivens claims, 
concluding that they were based on clearly established rights 
at the time of the alleged violations, making the defense of 
qualified immunity inapplicable.  Id. at 702, 707, 711-12.  
Those three claims survived, however, only against certain 
defendants.  Id.  
 
 More specifically, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for five defendants on Bistrian’s Fifth Amendment 
failure-to-protect claim, but it denied summary judgment for 
the eight defendants who bring this appeal.  Id. at 700-02.  It 
decided that there were material issues of fact as to whether 
those eight “were deliberately indifferent to the substantial 
risk to [Bistrian’s] safety[,]” id. at 700, and it highlighted 
evidence that it said could lead a reasonable jury to conclude 
that “Bergos [sic], Bowns, Gibbs, Jezior, Levi, McLaughlin, 
Robinson, and Rodgers knew of the note-passing scheme and 
were aware of the risk [Bistrian] faced once his cooperation 
… was discovered.”9  Id.  Because the right to be protected 
                                                 
 8  The dismissal of the Fifth Amendment procedural 
due process claim is not challenged on appeal.  Additionally, 
the United States filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
FTCA claims that was granted in part and denied in part.  The 
United States, however, is not a party to this appeal, and, 
thus, we do not address those claims. 
 
9  In particular, the District Court observed that, 
despite whatever protection the officials provided Bistrian by 
discontinuing his orderly duties, they “did not take action to 
prevent [him] from encountering Northington in the 
recreation area.”  Bistrian III, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 701.  The 
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against prisoner-on-prisoner violence was already clearly 
established, the Court said, qualified immunity did not apply.  
Id. at 702.   
 
 As to Bistrian’s Fifth Amendment punitive detention 
claim, the District Court granted summary judgment for all 
defendants except Levi and Jezior.  Id. at 706.  It determined 
that a genuine dispute of material fact existed “regarding 
whether [in sending Bistrian to the SHU for the fourth time] 
Jezior and Levi expressly intended to punish him for his 
protests to the Court[.]”  Id. at 706.  The Court relied on the 
timing of Jezior’s incident report leading to the fourth 
confinement, as well as Levi’s purported statement that 
Bistrian “would never see the light of day again[.]”  Id.  
Qualified immunity, again, was not available because the 
right to be free from punitive detention was already clearly 
established at the time.  Id. at 707.     
 
 So too, the First Amendment retaliation claim was 
allowed to proceed against Levi and Jezior.  Id. at 710-11.  
The District Court determined that Bistrian’s challenge to his 
SHU confinements was a protected activity and that his fourth 
assignment to the SHU could be seen as a retaliatory and 
adverse action taken by Jezior and Levi, given the 
“suggestive temporal proximity” of Jezior’s incident report 
and the obvious import of the “never see the light of day” 
                                                                                                             
 
Court reasoned that Bistrian had “put forth evidence showing 
that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial 
risk of serious harm[,]” given his proximity to members of the 
Savage-Northington gang after they discovered the note-
passing scheme.  Id. at 700-01. 
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comment that Levi allegedly made.  Id.  Once again, qualified 
immunity was not justified, the Court said, because the right 
against retaliation was clearly established at the time.  Id. at 
711-12.   
 
Following the District Court’s summary judgment 
ruling, the eight defendants before us now filed their timely 
interlocutory appeals, which have been consolidated for 
review. 
 
III. JURISDICTION10  
 
“[W]e normally do not entertain appeals from a district 
court order denying a motion for summary judgment because 
such orders do not put an end to the litigation.” Rivas v. City 
of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2004).  That holds true 
when the district court denies qualified immunity based on a 
determination that material facts remain in dispute.  Id.  We 
can, however, entertain appeals based on a denial of “a 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment so long as: (1) the 
defendant is a public official asserting a qualified immunity 
defense; and (2) the issue on appeal is whether the facts 
alleged by the plaintiff demonstrate a violation of clearly 
established federal law, not which facts the plaintiff might be 
able to prove at trial.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Mitchell 
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985)).  In other words, we 
cannot review a decision in which the only question relates to 
“evidence sufficiency” in the sense of what facts can be 
                                                 
10 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343.   
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proven.11 See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 196 
(3d Cir. 2017).  
 
Some of the defendants’ arguments raise factual issues 
and so are outside our jurisdiction on this interlocutory 
appeal.12  But the defendants also challenge whether the 
                                                 
11  Use of the phrase “evidence sufficiency” here does 
not indicate that an appellant cannot challenge whether the 
undisputed evidence supports a finding of qualified 
immunity.  That is a legal question over which we may 
exercise jurisdiction.  We use the phrase as did the Supreme 
Court when it said that “a question of ‘evidence sufficiency,’ 
i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at 
trial” is not an appealable final order. Johnson v. Jones, 515 
U.S. 304, 313 (1995); see also Montanez v. Thompson, 603 
F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 25, 2010) 
(“The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that this 
qualified immunity exception does not include interlocutory 
appeals of a district court’s evidence sufficiency 
determinations at summary judgment.”). 
12 For example, Warden Levi contends the District 
Court erred because there was insufficient evidence of 
officers’ awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm to 
Bistrian from inmate-on-inmate violence.  That is not 
appealable at this stage because Levi’s argument is based on 
the District Court’s conclusion that Bistrian had evidence of a 
fact that he may prove at trial, specifically he had “pointed to 
evidence showing that [some officials] knew of the note-
passing scheme and were aware of the risk [Bistrian] 
faced[.]” Bistrian III, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 701.  
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District Court properly applied principles of qualified 
immunity in denying summary judgment on the three Bivens 
actions.  Those arguments involve only questions of law, 
including whether the rights in question were clearly 
established.  Id. at 197.  “And since the issue of whether a 
[Bivens] cause of action even exists … is a threshold question 
of law, we have jurisdiction to consider that as well.”  Id.  
Accordingly, what follows is a review of the dispositive legal 
questions raised by the qualified immunity defenses to 
Bistrian’s claims for failure to protect and punitive detention 
under the Fifth Amendment, and for retaliation under the First 
Amendment.   
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
                                                                                                             
 
The defendants also challenge the District Court’s 
qualified immunity analysis because, they say, as a matter of 
law, the Court failed to engage in a sufficiently particularized 
analysis with regard to each claim and each defendant.  The 
District Court’s ruling, however, resulted in denying 
summary judgment as to certain defendants on certain claims 
and granting summary judgment to other defendants on other 
claims.  The Court could not have conducted a one-size-fits-
all analysis because it reached different conclusions as to 
different defendants on each of the claims it let proceed.  
There was a sufficiently particularized analysis, and, we agree 
with Bistrian that the defendants’ attempts to argue that the 
District Court erred as a matter of law are nothing more than 
“a disguised insufficiency of the evidence contention.”  
(Bistrian Answering Br. I at 25.)   
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As we will explain, Bistrian has a cognizable Bivens 
cause of action for the alleged failure of the defendants to 
protect him from a substantial risk of serious injury at the 
hands of other inmates.  The prisoner-on-prisoner violence is 
not a new context for Bivens claims, and no special factors 
counsel against allowing a failure-to-protect cause of action.  
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of 
summary judgment with respect to that claim.  We must, 
however, reverse the denial of summary judgment on 
Bistrian’s claims for punitive detention and retaliation 
because they are novel and special factors counsel against 
extending Bivens coverage to such claims.   
 
A. Waiver 
 
Before turning to the merits, though, there is a 
preliminary question: whether the defendants waived their 
arguments against the availability of Bivens claims.13  Bivens 
is the short-hand name given to causes of action against 
federal officials for alleged constitutional violations.  In the 
                                                 
13  While “waiver” is defined as a “voluntary 
relinquishment or abandonment … of a legal right or 
advantage[,]” we recognize that the term “waiver” is used 
loosely to refer to the loss of the right to challenge a ruling on 
appeal due to failure to object at trial or to otherwise 
sufficiently raise an argument in the trial court.  Waiver, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  We would be more 
precise if we used the term “forfeiture,” Forfeiture, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), but, in light of the historical 
use of the term waiver with respect to the forfeiture of 
arguments, we use it throughout this opinion.  
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eponymous case, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
“violation of [the Fourth Amendment] by a federal agent 
acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of 
action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional 
conduct.”  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.  The Court held that such 
a claim was cognizable and that the plaintiff was “entitled to 
recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a 
result of the agents’ violation of the [Fourth] Amendment.”  
Id. at 397.  Thus was born an implied right of action to 
recover damages against federal officials for constitutional 
violations.  
 
Prior to the present appeal, none of the eight 
defendants before us challenged the existence of a Bivens 
cause of action for failure to protect or for punitive detention, 
and only two of the defendants, Levi and Jezior, questioned 
the existence of a retaliation claim, and they did so only in 
passing.14  Bistrian thus argues that the defendants have 
waived their right to challenge the availability of a Bivens 
remedy.  We conclude, however, that the cognizability of the 
Bivens claims is a question inherent in the qualified immunity 
defenses.  To rule otherwise would be to allow new causes of 
action to spring into existence merely through the dereliction 
of a party.  
 
Whether a Bivens claim exists in a particular context is 
“antecedent to the other questions presented.”  Hernandez v. 
                                                 
14  The existence of a Bivens retaliation claim was 
raised by Jezior and Levi in one sentence in a motion-to-
dismiss reply brief and one sentence in the summary-
judgment briefing.   
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Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (citation omitted).  It is 
thus “a threshold question of law” that “is directly implicated 
by the defense of qualified immunity[.]”  Vanderklok, 868 
F.3d at 197 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 
(2007)).  We can sometimes resolve a case by demonstrating 
that a plaintiff would lose on the constitutional claim he 
raises, even if Bivens provided a remedy for that type of 
claim.15  See Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (approving 
“dispos[al] of a Bivens claim by resolving the constitutional 
question, while assuming the existence of a Bivens remedy”).  
But threshold questions are called that for a reason, and it will 
often be best to tackle head on whether Bivens provides a 
remedy, when that is unsettled.  See id. at 2006-07 
(remanding case to court of appeals to address existence of 
Bivens cause of action in first instance).   
 
That is true whether the parties raise the question or 
not.  Assuming the existence of a Bivens cause of action—
without deciding the issue—can risk needless expenditure of 
the parties’ and the courts’ time and resources.  Thus, even 
when a defendant does not raise the issue of whether a Bivens 
remedy exists for a particular constitutional violation, we may 
still consider the issue in the interest of justice.  See Carlson 
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980) (concluding “that the 
interests of judicial administration w[ould] be served by 
                                                 
15  “Whether a cause of action exists is not a question 
of jurisdiction, and may be assumed without being decided.”  
Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union 
AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 523 n.3 (1991).  Accordingly, the 
fact that a Bivens action might not exist does not deprive this 
Court of jurisdiction to resolve the issues raised. 
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addressing” the existence of a Bivens cause of action even 
though the issue was “not presented below”).   
 
Accordingly, we consider whether a Bivens cause of 
action exists for each claim at issue here.   
 
B. Bivens Analysis   
 
“[F]or decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
refused to extend Bivens actions beyond the specific clauses 
of the specific amendments [of the Constitution] for which a 
cause of action has already been implied, or even to other 
classes of defendants facing liability under those same 
clauses.”  Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 200.  The Supreme Court’s 
recent opinion in Ziglar v. Abbasi said bluntly “that 
expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial 
activity[,]” but it noted that Bivens actions have been 
recognized in three contexts.  137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855, 1857 
(2017) (citation omitted).  First, as mentioned earlier, in the 
Bivens case itself the Court recognized an implied cause of 
action for violations of the Fourth Amendment’s right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  403 U.S. at 397.  In the 
following decade, the Court recognized two other Bivens 
actions: one under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause for gender discrimination in the employment context, 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979), and another 
under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause for inadequate prison medical care, 
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23-25.16   
                                                 
16  In Abbasi, the Supreme Court suggested that its 
analysis for those three recognized Bivens remedies “might 
20 
 
 
Indicating concern about any further expansion of 
implied rights, the Court in Abbasi “established a rigorous 
inquiry” to determine whether a Bivens cause of action should 
be recognized in a new context.  Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 200.  
First, courts must determine whether a case presents “a new 
Bivens context[,]” by asking whether or not the case “is 
different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases 
decided by [the Supreme] Court[.]”  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 
1859.  Examples of potentially meaningful differences 
include “the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional 
right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official 
action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer 
should respond to the problem or emergency to be 
confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which 
the officer was operating; [and] the risk of disruptive 
intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other 
branches[.]”  Id. at 1860.   
 
If the case does present an extension of Bivens into a 
new context, we turn to the second step of Abbasi and ask 
whether any “special factors counsel[] hesitation” in 
permitting the extension.  Id. at 1857.   There may be many 
such factors, but two are particularly weighty: the existence 
of an alternative remedial structure and separation-of-powers 
principles.  Id. at 1857-58.  The first factor – whether an 
alternative remedial structure is available – may by itself 
“limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause 
of action.”  Id. at 1858.  And any time the second factor – 
                                                                                                             
 
have been different if they were decided today.”  137 S. Ct. at 
1856.   
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separation-of-powers principles – is in play, that “should be 
central to the analysis.”  Id. at 1857.  The Court noted other 
special factors that could be considered, including: the 
potential cost to the government of recognizing a private 
cause of action, both financially and administratively; 
whether the judiciary is well suited to weigh those costs; the 
necessity to deter future violations; whether Congress has 
already acted in that arena, suggesting it does not “want the 
Judiciary to interfere”; whether a claim addresses individual 
conduct or a broader policy question; whether litigation 
would intrude on the function of other branches of 
government; and whether national security is at stake.  Id. at 
1856-63.  
 
1. “Failure to Protect” Under the Fifth 
 Amendment 
 
Contrary to the opposition of some of the defendants,17 
an inmate’s claim that prison officials violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights by failing to protect him against a known 
risk of substantial harm does not present a new Bivens 
context.  On the contrary, we recognized just such a claim 45 
years ago in Curtis v. Everette.  489 F.2d 516, 518-19 (3d Cir. 
1973) (recognizing constitutional due process right for 
prisoner to be free from violent attack by fellow prisoner).  
Moreover, the Supreme Court ratified that kind of claim some 
20 years later in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-49 
(1994), and we recently concluded, in Bistrian II, that a 
                                                 
17  Although the defendants did not challenge the 
existence of a Bivens remedy for Bistrian’s failure-to-protect 
claim in the District Court, two defendants, Officers Gibbs 
and Rodgers raised it in their opening briefs on appeal.   
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pretrial detainee “ha[s] a clearly established constitutional 
right to have prison officials protect him from inmate 
violence[,]”  696 F.3d at 367.   
 
Farmer is of greatest significance.  In that case, the 
Court assessed a “failure to protect” claim brought under the 
Eighth Amendment and Bivens as a result of prisoner-on-
prisoner violence.  511 U.S. at 829-34.  Although the Farmer 
Court did not explicitly state that it was recognizing a Bivens 
claim, it not only vacated the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the prison officials but also discussed at length 
“deliberate indifference” as the legal standard to assess a 
Bivens claim, the standard by which all subsequent prisoner 
safety claims have been assessed.  Id. at 832-49.  It seems 
clear, then, that the Supreme Court has, pursuant to Bivens, 
recognized a failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth 
Amendment.18  See Doty v. Hollingsworth, Civ. No. 15-3016, 
2018 WL 1509082, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018) (holding that 
an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim premised on 
                                                 
18  Counsel for the defendants seemed to admit as 
much at oral argument: “[Counsel:] In Farmer v. Brennan, 
the Supreme Court seemed to have implied a cause of action 
and then went and started to talk about a failure-to-protect 
claim and what would be the culpability level of an official.  
[The Court:] So why doesn’t Farmer vs. Brennan say there is 
… a Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment for failure to 
protect, that’s what Farmer v. Brennan is all about?  
[Counsel:] It is.”  (Oral Arg. Tr. at 5:36-6:01.)  And, some 
defendants’ briefs analyzed Bistrain’s claim under the Farmer 
framework.   
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inmate-on-inmate violence is not a new context given 
sufficient similarity to both Carlson and Farmer).   
 
Abbasi does not contradict that reasoning.  It is true 
that Abbasi identified three Bivens contexts and did not 
address, or otherwise cite to, Farmer.  137 S. Ct. at 1854-55.  
But we decline to “conclude [that the Supreme Court’s] more 
recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier 
precedent.”  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).  It 
may be that the Court simply viewed the failure-to-protect 
claim as not distinct from the Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference claim in the medical context.  Farmer continues 
to be the case that most directly deals with whether a Bivens 
remedy is available for a failure-to-protect claim resulting in 
physical injury.  137 S. Ct. at 832-34. 
 
As in Farmer, Bistrian seeks a remedy against prison 
officials for their failure to protect him from prisoner-on-
prisoner violence.  Id.  Bistrian’s claim, however, arises under 
the Fifth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, because he 
was a pretrial detainee at the time of the Northington 
Attack.19  But that does not warrant the conclusion that, in 
applying Bivens to a pretrial detainee’s claim under the Fifth 
Amendment as opposed to a post-conviction prisoner’s claim 
under the Eighth Amendment, we would be extending Bivens 
                                                 
19  “Pretrial detainees are not within the ambit of the 
Eighth Amendment but are entitled to the protections of the 
Due Process clause.”  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 
(3d. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).  The Fifth Amendment 
protects pretrial detainees, while the Eighth Amendment 
protects post-trial convicts.  Id. 
 
24 
 
to a new context.  Indeed, Farmer practically dictates our 
ruling today because it is a given that the Fifth Amendment 
provides the same, if not more, protection for pretrial 
detainees than the Eighth Amendment does for imprisoned 
convicts.20  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 n.10 (3d. 
Cir. 1993) (“Pretrial detainees … are entitled to at least as 
much protection as convicted prisoners, so the protections of 
the Eighth Amendment would seem to establish a floor of 
sorts.”).  Accordingly, although Bistrian’s claim derives from 
a different Amendment, it is not “different in a meaningful 
way” from the claim at issue in Farmer.  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 
1859.  The failure-to-protect claim here thus does not call for 
any extension of Bivens.  
 
The defendants ignore Farmer and urge that not only 
would allowance of this claim impermissibly extend Bivens, 
but there are special factors that counsel against such an 
extension.  Since we conclude a failure-to-protect claim does 
not present a new context, there is no need to address the 
second step and consider special factors.  See Abbasi, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1860 (observing that if the case presents a new Bivens 
context, “a special factors analysis [is] required before 
allowing [the] damages suit to proceed”).  Even if there were 
such a need, however, the factors the defendants point to—
namely, first, the existence of alternative remedial structures, 
second, the implication of the passage of the PLRA, and third, 
separation of powers principles—are unpersuasive, given the 
weight and clarity of relevant Supreme Court precedent.  
                                                 
20 Defendant Gibbs admitted that “[t]he Due Process 
Clause affords Bistrian the same protection as the Eight 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.”  
(Gibbs Opening Br. at 19.)  
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First, the existence of an FTCA remedy does not 
foreclose an analogous remedy under Bivens.  According to 
the Supreme Court, it is “crystal clear that Congress intended 
the FTCA and Bivens to serve as parallel and complementary 
sources of liability.”  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 
61, 68 (2001) (citation omitted).  For example, in Carlson, the 
Supreme Court specifically noted that a “Bivens remedy … is 
a more effective deterrent than the FTCA” because it “is 
recoverable against individuals[.]”  446 U.S. at 21.  The Court 
continued by saying that the “FTCA is not a sufficient 
protector of the citizens’ constitutional rights, and without a 
clear congressional mandate we cannot hold that Congress 
relegated [prisoners] exclusively to the FTCA remedy.”  Id. at 
23; see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (“No 
statute expressly declared the FTCA remedy to be a substitute 
for a Bivens action.”).   
 
If that precedent were not enough, the FTCA itself 
appears to recognize the complementary existence of Bivens 
actions by creating an exception for suits against individual 
federal officers for constitutional violations.  See Vanderklok, 
868 F.3d at 201 (stating that the FTCA, in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2679(b)(2)(A), “notes that a Bivens action itself is 
available.”).  So the prospect of relief under the FTCA is 
plainly not a special factor counseling hesitation in allowing a 
Bivens remedy.  Id. 
 
The defendants argue that two other remedial routes 
were available to Bistrian, namely, the prison administrative 
grievance process and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
But neither of those should prevent the availability of Bivens 
because they cannot redress Bistrian’s alleged harm.  Like 
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Bivens, this is a case where “it is damages or nothing.”  
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862 (citation omitted).  The beating 
that Bistrian took in the prison yard was allegedly the result 
of “individual instances of [official misconduct], which due to 
their very nature are difficult to address except by way of 
damages actions after the fact.”  Id.  The administrative 
grievance process is not an alternative because it does not 
redress Bistrian’s harm, which could only be remedied by 
money damages.  See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 70 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (observing that money damages are “not available 
under the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative process.” 
(citations omitted)).  Similarly, a habeas petition would not 
address Bistrian’s harms, because it too gives no retrospective 
relief.  Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) 
(observing that habeas relief does not provide for damages).  
Accordingly, there are no true alternative remedies 
counseling against allowing a Bivens remedy for a Fifth 
Amendment claim based on a failure to protect.  
 
Next, the defendants argue that congressional silence 
in the PLRA about the availability of Bivens remedies is 
evidence of an intent that there be none.  That silence, 
however, does not bear the meaning the defendants ascribe to 
it.  The PLRA was enacted “to eliminate unwarranted federal-
court interference with the administration of prisons” and “to 
reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner 
suits.”21  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006) 
                                                 
21  Abbasi discussed the impact of the PLRA’s 
enactment, noting that it “made comprehensive changes to the 
way prisoner abuse claims must be brought in federal court.”  
137 S. Ct. at 1865.   
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(citation omitted).  Therefore, the PLRA reflects Congress’s 
intent to make more rigorous the process prisoners must 
follow to bring suit in federal court.  And, of dispositive note, 
the PLRA has been interpreted to govern the process by 
which federal prisoners bring Bivens claims.  Nyhuis v. Reno, 
204 F.3d 65, 68-69 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1865 (“This Court has said in dicta that the [PLRA’s] 
exhaustion provisions would apply to Bivens suits.”).  The 
very statute that regulates how Bivens actions are brought 
cannot rightly be seen as dictating that a Bivens cause of 
action should not exist at all.22   
 
Finally, the defendants argue that separation-of-powers 
principles counsel against providing a Bivens remedy in suits 
like this.  It is true that Bivens is not the “proper vehicle for 
altering an entity’s policy” and that “[t]he purpose of Bivens 
is to deter the officer.”  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860 (citations 
omitted).  Hence, in Abbasi, a Bivens claim was not allowed 
where the plaintiffs challenged “the formal policy adopted by 
… Executive Officials” imposing restrictive housing 
conditions.  Id. at 1858, 1860.  Here, however, Bistrian’s 
claim challenges particular individuals’ actions or inaction in 
a particular incident – the specific decision to place him in the 
yard with Northington and other prisoners and then to not 
                                                 
22 “It could be argued that [silence in the PLRA] 
suggests Congress chose not to extend the Carlson damages 
remedy to cases involving other types of prisoner 
mistreatment.”  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865.  It is equally, if 
not more, likely, however, that Congress simply wanted to 
reduce the volume of prisoner suits by imposing exhaustion 
requirements, rather to eliminate whole categories of claims 
through silence and implication.   
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intervene when he was being savagely beaten.  Addressing 
that incident will, it is true, unavoidably implicate “policies 
regarding inmate safety and security[,]” (e.g., Gibbs Opening 
Br. at 18-19,) but that would be true of practically all claims 
arising in a prison.  Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 
(1974) (“[C]entral to all other corrections goals is the 
institutional consideration of internal security within the 
corrections facilities themselves.”).  Farmer shows that that 
alone cannot be a complete barrier to Bivens liability, because 
“gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by 
another serves no legitimate penological objectiv[e.]”  511 
U.S. at 833-34 (citation omitted) (setting the “deliberate 
indifference” standard to ensure that prison officials do not 
forgo their responsibility “to protect prisoners from violence 
at the hands of other prisoners”); see, e.g., Benefield v. 
McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(implementing the standard from Farmer for a Bivens failure-
to-protect claim).  Bistrian’s claim fits squarely within 
Bivens’ purpose of deterring misconduct by prison officials.  
And, since failure-to-protect claims have been allowed for 
many years, there is no good reason to fear that allowing 
Bistrian’s claim will unduly affect the independence of the 
executive branch in setting and administering prison policies.   
 
In sum, a special factors analysis does not counsel 
hesitation, and the District Court correctly denied the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to 
Bistrian’s failure-to-protect claim.  As we previously 
concluded, “Bistrian—as an inmate who at all relevant times 
was either not yet convicted or convicted but not yet 
sentenced—had a clearly established constitutional right to 
have prison officials protect him from inmate violence.”  
Bistrian II, 696 F.3d at 367.  That conclusion was based on a 
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right that was recognized in Farmer and not overruled by 
Abbasi, and thus a right that remains clearly established.  See 
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237 (declining to “conclude [that the 
Supreme Court’s] more recent cases have, by implication, 
overruled an earlier precedent.”).  Abbasi changed the 
framework of analysis for Bivens claims generally, but not the 
existence of the particular right to Bivens relief for prisoner-
on-prisoner violence. 
 
2. Punitive Detention Under the Fifth 
 Amendment 
 
 Bistrian’s claim for damages for punitive detention is a 
different matter altogether.  Unlike the failure-to-protect 
claim, the punitive-detention claim does amount to an 
extension of Bivens into a new context, and special factors do 
counsel against creating a new Bivens remedy in that context, 
so we hold there is no Bivens cause of action for that alleged 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.   
 
Citing Carlson and Davis, Bistrian argues that his 
punitive-detention claim is not really a Bivens novelty 
because the Supreme Court has “expressly extended Bivens 
both to the Fifth Amendment, … and to the prison context[.]”  
(Bistrian Answering Br. II at 26 (citations omitted).)  That 
does not hold water.  Abbasi expressly warns that, even if 
there are “significant parallels to one of the Court’s previous 
Bivens cases,” “a modest extension is still an extension.”  137 
S. Ct. at 1864.  Neither Carlson nor Davis addressed a 
constitutional right against punitive detention, and that alone 
warrants recognizing this as a new context.  
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Turning to Abbasi’s second step, the special factors 
analysis counsels against extending Bivens to provide a 
remedy for punitive detention.  Unlike Bistrian’s failure-to-
protect claim, which relates to a specific and isolated event, a 
punitive-detention claim more fully calls in question broad 
policies pertaining to the reasoning, manner, and extent of 
prison discipline.  The warden and other prison officials 
have—and indeed must have—the authority to determine 
detention policies, to assess the endless variety of 
circumstances in which those policies may be implicated, and 
to decide when administrative detention is deserved and for 
how long.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) 
(observing, in the § 1983 context, that “federal courts ought 
to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state 
officials trying to manage a volatile [prison] environment” 
and thus should limit “the involvement of federal courts in the 
day-to-day management of prisons”).  Detention policies and 
their application cannot be helpfully reviewed as Bivens 
claims.  “[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the 
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and 
reform” because the problems “are complex and intractable, 
and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of 
resolution by decree.”  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 
(1987) (citation omitted).  The Bureau of Prisons, not the 
judiciary, has the “expertise, planning, and the commitment 
of resources” necessary for the difficult task of running a 
correctional facility.  Id. at 84-85.  Consequently, the task of 
prison administration “has been committed to the 
responsibility of [the legislative and executive] branches, and 
separation-of-powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial 
restraint.”  Id. at 85.  Ruling on administrative detention 
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policy matters would unduly encroach on the executive’s 
domain.23  See Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 
1980) (“It is a rule grounded in necessity and common sense, 
as well as authority, that the maintenance of discipline in a 
prison is an executive function with which the judicial branch 
ordinarily will not interfere.” (citation omitted)).    
 
Besides those serious separation of powers concerns, 
recognizing a Bivens remedy would likely cause “an increase 
of suits by inmates, increased litigation costs to the 
government, and … burdens on individual prison employees 
to defend such claims.”  (Gibbs Reply Br. at 24.)  Heeding the 
reasoning in Abbasi, we must be reluctant to “establish whole 
categories of cases in which federal officers must defend 
against personal liability claims in the complex sphere of 
litigation.”  137 S. Ct. at 1858.  Therefore, we will reverse the 
District Court’s denial of summary judgment with respect to 
Bistrian’s punitive-detention claim.  It is not a valid Bivens 
action.24   
                                                 
23 Bistrian argues that the Supreme Court has already 
extended Bivens to the prison setting in Carlson, and thus, 
approved of such an encroachment.  But medical care issues, 
which were at issue in Carlson, do not require analysis of the 
reasoning, motivations, or actions of prison officials in the 
same way a punitive-detention analysis would.  446 U.S. at 
15 n.1.  Thus, Carlson did not encroach on the executive 
branch in the manner Bistrian seeks.  
 
24  Since we conclude that the punitive detention claim 
is not cognizable, we need not address whether any of the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to 
that claim. 
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3. Retaliation Under the First Amendment 
 
 Likewise, we conclude that Bistrian’s claim for 
retaliation under the First Amendment presents a new context 
for Bivens and that special factors counsel against allowing 
such a claim.  
 
In the heyday of Bivens expansion, we recognized an 
implied right to sue federal officials for damages for a 
violation of the First Amendment.  For example, in Paton v. 
La Prade, we held that a high school student could seek a 
remedy under Bivens after the FBI created a dossier on her 
because she mailed an envelope to the Socialist Workers 
Party.  524 F.2d 862, 864-66, 870 (3d Cir. 1975).  We later 
extended Paton to imply a Bivens remedy under the First 
Amendment for the denial of a prisoner’s right of access to 
courts.  Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 
1981).  More recently, we implied a Bivens remedy for an 
inmate’s claim that prison officials retaliated against him for 
his exercise of his First Amendment rights.  Mack v. Warden 
Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[W]e reject 
the Government’s plea to not ‘extend’ Bivens to Mack’s First 
Amendment retaliation claim.”).  Since those cases were 
decided, however, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Abbasi, which clearly communicates that expanding Bivens 
beyond those contexts already recognized by the Supreme 
Court is disfavored.  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.  It is Abbasi, 
not our own prior precedent, that must guide us now.  
 
The Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens 
remedy under the First Amendment.  See Reichle v. Howards, 
566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4 (2012) (“We have never held that 
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Bivens extends to First Amendment claims.”).  Accordingly, 
from the vantage of boundaries set by the Supreme Court, 
Bistrian’s First Amendment retaliation claim is novel.  We 
thus turn to the special factors analysis. 
 
Retaliation claims are based on an adverse action 
following the exercise of constitutional rights.  Here, Bistrian 
alleges that his fourth placement in the SHU was punishment 
for complaining about his treatment by prison officials.  Like 
a punitive detention claim, retaliation claims like this one are 
grounded in administrative detention decisions.  Whether to 
place an inmate in more restrictive detention involves real-
time and often difficult judgment calls about disciplining 
inmates, maintaining order, and promoting prison officials’ 
safety and security.  See Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 
197 (4th Cir. 1961) (stating that courts should not interfere in 
prison administration when “particular disciplinary measures 
were taken within the normal management of the 
institution.”).  That strongly counsels restraint, just as in the 
punitive-detention context.  For the same reasons we reject an 
extension of Bivens to that latter context, we reject it here as 
well.  Such claims must be approached “with skepticism and 
particular care” because they are “easily fabricated and … 
may cause unwarranted judicial interference with prison 
administration.”  Holmes v. Grant, No. 03 Civ. 3426 RJH 
RLE, 2006 WL 851753, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) 
(citation omitted) (discussing First Amendment retaliation 
claims).   
 
That conclusion aligns with a strong trend in district 
courts, post-Abbasi, holding that a Bivens retaliation claim 
under the First Amendment should not be recognized.  See 
Akande v. Philips, No. 1:17-cv-01243 EAW, 2018 WL 
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3425009, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. July 11, 2018) (collecting cases 
and noting that “[n]ationwide, district courts seem to be in 
agreement that, post-Abbasi, prisoners have no right to bring 
a Bivens action for violation of the First Amendment” 
(citation omitted)).  We agree with that view. 
 
Bistrian’s retaliation claim involves executive policies, 
implicates separation-of-power concerns, and threatens a 
large burden to both the judiciary and prison officials. We 
thus conclude that the special factors analysis prevents an 
extension of Bivens to cover such claims.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the District Court’s denial of summary judgment 
with respect to his retaliation claim.25   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of summary judgment for the defendants on 
Bistrian’s failure-to-protect claim but will reverse its decision 
with respect to his punitive detention and retaliation claims. 
 
                                                 
25  Because we conclude that the retaliation claim is not 
a recognized Bivens remedy, we again need not address 
whether any of the defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
